Companies in Victorian Britain operated in a laissez-faire legal environment from the perspective of outside investors, implying that such investors were not protected by the legal system. This paper seeks to identify the alternative mechanisms which outside shareholders used to protect themselves by examining the dividend policy and governance of over 800 publicly-traded companies at the beginning of the 1880s. We assess the importance of these mechanisms by estimating their impact on Tobin's Q. Our evidence suggests that dividends and well-structured and incentivised boards of directors may have played a role in protecting the interests of outside investors.
Introduction
The British capital market underwent a great transformation in the nineteenth century in terms of the number and value of equity securities. 1 The liberalisation of incorporation law and the establishment of regional stock exchanges removed supply constraints, whilst the increasing wealth and financial sophistication of the middle classes simultaneously increased the demand for publicly-traded equity. The rapid growth in the number of companies issuing such equity raises the question as to how outside investors were assured that they would receive a return on their investment as well as their initial capital back. 2 Recent academic studies have suggested that the legal system plays an important role in determining the level of protection enjoyed by outside shareholders. 3 However, in the Victorian era, British company law and common-law principles were laissez-faire in this regard. 4 How such shareholders protected themselves in this era against expropriation by corporate insiders (i.e. managers) is the subject under investigation in this article.
In this article, using data on over 800 companies, we examine whether dividends were an important means of protecting outside investors in Victorian capital markets.
Dividends can be viewed as a substitute for legal protection as paying out substantial proportions of earnings prevents managers diverting cash flows and may submit them to 1 In terms of the growth in the number and value of equity securities in the nineteenth century see Acheson et al, 'Rule Britannia' and Grossman, 'New indices'. According to Michie, London Stock Exchange, p.89 , the nominal value of company securities (apart from railways) quoted in the Stock Exchange Official List as a proportion of the total nominal value of listed securities was 5.5 per cent in 1853, 7.4 per cent in 1883, and 19.8 per cent by 1903. 2 "Outside investors" in contrast to "insiders" are investors who are not directly involved in the governance of the firm. They are also referred to in the literature as minority shareholders or investors. 3 La Porta et al. 'Legal determinants', 'Law and finance', 'Corporate ownership', 'Agency problems', 'Investor protection'. 4 Cheffins, 'History', 'Does law matter?'; Cottrell, Industrial finance, chap. 3; Kennedy, Industrial structure, p.126. the discipline of the capital markets. 5 We also examine corporate governance mechanisms which may have played a role in protecting shareholders. The effectiveness of dividends and these various governance mechanisms in protecting outside shareholders is tested by analysing their impact on corporate value as measured by Tobin's Q.
Our regression results suggest that dividends and well-structured and incentivised boards may have played a role in protecting shareholders. In addition, there is some evidence to suggest that informal trust mechanisms (as measured by the proximity of investors to the company) played some role in protecting shareholders of locally-based companies. On the other hand, shareholder voting mechanisms don't appear to have protected shareholders.
The findings of this article may have some bearing on the long-running debate on the role of the capital markets in the alleged failure of the Victorian economy. 6 The general claim is that there was a bias towards either foreign or safe securities. Although investors have been largely absolved of blame, there is a view that financial infrastructure was in someway defective. 7 In particular, the permissive nature of company law vis-à-vis shareholders has been highlighted as a major cause of the bias towards safe securities. 8 This article contributes to this debate by suggesting that investors may have been able to protect themselves in this laissez-faire legal environment.
Although this article focuses on Victorian capital markets, it has a broader significance for contemporary debates within financial economics. Firstly, the results of this article suggest, contrary to the work of contemporary 'law and finance' scholars, that 5 Cheffins, 'Dividends as a substitute '. 6 See McCloskey, 'Did Victorian Britain fail?' 7 Edelstein, Overseas investment; Kennedy, Industrial structure. See Michie, "Finance of innovation" for a strong rebuttal of the view that the capital markets failed British industry. 8 Cottrell, Industrial finance, p.54; Crafts, 'Long-run growth', p.17; Kennedy, Industrial structure, p.127. dividends may be a substitute for weak investor protection. Tobin's Q. The final section is a brief conclusion.
Legal and extralegal protection for outside investors
The gradual liberalisation of British incorporation law, commencing in the mid-1820s
with the repeal of the infamous Bubble Act 10 and the enactment of the Banking Copartnership Act 11 , and continuing with the Companies Act of 1844 12 and the 1855
Limited Liability Act 13 , resulted in a myriad of Acts governing the incorporation of and regulating the behaviour of companies. As a consequence, the 1862 Companies Act, 14 was passed to consolidate these (and other) existing pieces of legislation. Apart from the railway companies, the vast majority of publicly-traded companies in the last quarter of 9 See La Porta et al., 'Agency problems'. 10 6 Geo. IV, c.91. 11 7 Geo. IV, c.46. This Act only permitted note-issuing banks to form on a joint-stock basis provided they were located outside a sixty-five mile radius of London. Remaining subsequent legal doubts with regard to the establishment of non-issuing joint-stock banks within this radius were eliminated with the passage of the Bank of England Privileges Act, 1833 (3 & 4 Will. 4, c.98 shareholders to call for this appointment as shareholders having at least one-fifth of total capital had to make the application. Consequently, as a contemporary legal scholar noted, this is "a very useful provision for the benefit and protection of shareholders, but one seldom taken advantage of". 17 Nevertheless, the existence of such a provision may have placed a lower limit on the expropriation activities of insiders.
The 1862 Act didn't impose a compulsory audit upon firms. 18 The absence of rigorous disclosure requirements had the alleged effect of making uninvited takeovers Table A , s. 27, 32, 48, 83. proxy voting. In addition, it required (without specifying to what extent) that directors must be shareholders and that companies are subject to a compulsory audit. Section 75 of the Act stated that companies are free to have their own voting scales, but offered a default graduated voting scale of one vote for every share up to 10, one vote for every five shares up to 100, and one vote for every ten shares above 100.
As well as weak protection afforded by legislative law, common-law judges in Victorian Britain were generally reluctant to interfere in internal business affairs in order to protect the interests of outside shareholders apart from cases where fraud was involved. 23 In fact the judiciary was, if anything, unsympathetic towards the idea of protecting outside shareholders as was demonstrated in the famous 1843 case of Foss vs.
Harbottle. 24 The judge in this case ruled that (a) where a director wrongs a company, the proper plaintiff is the company itself, not an individual shareholder, and (b) when a wrong is ratified by a majority of shareholders, an individual shareholder does not have a locus standi to proceed with an action against the company.
The absence of strong legal protection in Victorian Britain is perhaps not surprising given that the legislature believed that laissez-faire theory and the practice of partnerships taught that capitalists could look after themselves. 25 The ultimate effect, 
Concentrated ownership
Ownership concentration data is not readily available for companies in the Victorian era. 37 Nevertheless, we know that some publicly-traded companies in late Victorian
Britain had diffuse ownership. In particular, banks and railways, the two largest sectors in the equity market, did not typically have concentrated ownership due either to their size (in the case of railways and large London banks) or restrictions on the proportion of shares which one individual could own (in the case of many banks).
38
It has been commonly believed that the commercial and industrial publicly-traded companies in Victorian Britain may have been different from railways, banks and other sectors in that they had concentrated ownership, even well into the twentieth century.
39
Hannah has recently questioned this standard view by suggesting that London's listing requirement of a two-thirds free float resulted in at least two-thirds of stock ending up in 36 Unfortunately, partial information and data was reported for some firms. In particular, there were no voting rules reported for just over 100 companies. 37 the hands of outside owners, which led to a separation of ownership from control. 40 In response, Cheffins has argued that the two-thirds rule only applied to companies listed on the London market and was easily circumvented by others. 41 Cheffins also notes that David Chadwick's firm, which helped organise public offerings in the 1860s and 70s
encouraged vendors to retain a sizeable stake in the floated company.
42
From the perspective of the outside shareholder perspective, the structure of ownership may not necessarily matter. 43 Although concentrated ownership may provide stronger incentives to monitor management and restrain the diversion of corporate resources, it may not be unambiguously good for outside shareholders as large owners can use their power to abuse minority interests. 44 Nevertheless, in case ownership structure does matter, we analyse the two industries which had diffuse ownership (banks and railways) separately in our econometric work.
Although we may not know much about ownership concentration, we do know that many companies had extensive shareholder constituencies. For example, even by the mid-1850s, the average shareholder constituency for the ten largest railways was 7,700.
45
The 112 British banks reported in the 1880 Banking Almanac had on average 661.9 shareholders, with 15 having more than 1,000 shareholders, and four having in excess of 3,000 owners.
46
Shareholder constituencies exceeding 1,000 were typical in the following sectors: docks, gas, water, telegraph and shipping. 47 The insurance companies 40 Hannah, 'Divorce of ownership'. 41 shareholders.
49
The size of these shareholder constituencies indicates that even if companies did have large blockholders, there were many small outside shareholders investing in these companies who required assurance that they would receive a return on their investment.
Locally-based shareholder constituency
Berle and Means have suggested that in this era investors were able to protect themselves and hence did not need legal protection because "the corporation was small enough so that he could maintain direct contact with responsible individuals; and thus, either because of his individual influence, or his knowledge of the affairs of the corporation, and community sentiment in general, the law needed to worry little about him."
50
On the other hand, they suggest that the size and geographical spread of large corporations raised the cost to shareholders of monitoring managers. Easterbrook and Fischel, 'Voting', p.396. decline in attendance at AGMs as well as the desire of Victorian investors for greater stock marketability.
64
As BOI reports the voting rules and scales of each company, we can measure whether or not voting systems were weighted towards outside shareholders.
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Admittedly, it is likely that most votes at general meetings were initially conducted by a show of hands to gauge whether or not a proposal had clear support. However, if there was no clear majority and if the chairman or a group of shareholder demanded a poll, the voting schemes were applied.
From Table 2 we can see that just less than a quarter of our sample had voting rights which placed a cap on the number of votes which any one shareholder could exercise, and graduated voting scales were employed by about 43 per cent of companies.
On the other hand, about 48 per cent of companies had no caps on voting and didn't have a graduated voting scheme.
In Table 3 we see that older (and larger) firms were more likely to have voting rules which were weighted towards outside shareholders. 
Boards of directors
Boards of directors are usually viewed as endogenously determined institutions designed to ameliorate the ability of insiders to expropriate outside shareholders. 66 They can also be viewed as delegated monitors of management who construct optimal managerial incentive contracts. 67 Obviously, for boards to be credible, they need to have independent directors who act on behalf of shareholders by keeping executive directors in check. One judge commenting on the rise of independent directors in Victorian Britain suggested that they reassured outside investors of the worth of the firm. 68 However, during the Victorian era, there was a common perception that public companies often selected independent directors for their social position rather than their business experience -hence they were given the appellation 'ornamental' directors. 69 Such directors were regarded "either too incompetent or too pre-occupied to become useful members of the board", and were viewed as being "more frequently incumbrances than aids."
70
In order to get a measure of the prevalence of independent directors who were appointed because of their social position (the so-called 'ornamental' directors), we count the number of directors from the ruling class (i.e. MPs and aristocrats) on boards. As can be seen from Table 4 , the average number of ruling-class directors was 0.79, with an average of 9.57 per cent of board members coming from the ruling class. 71 As we can see from Table 5 , company age and the presence of ruling-class directors are positively correlated, suggesting that such directors were more prevalent in the established companies. Notably, there is a negative correlation between the presence of ruling class directors and locally-traded stock, which could be evidence supporting the view that shareholders in locally-traded companies can more easily influence board structure so that 'ornamental' directors were not appointed. Alternatively, such directors may have been appointed to non-regionally-based companies as a means of assuring investors.
A mechanism which may align the interests of directors and shareholders is to require directors to own stock in the company before they take up their directorship. In the Victorian era such a requirement was often included in a company's constitution.
72
Indeed, Victorian investors were frequently given the advice to "watch your directors", and this practically meant keeping a check on who the directors were, particularly the managing directors, and how much of the stock they owned.
73
Of the 791 companies for which we have board data, 654 placed share qualifications upon their directors. As can be observed from We therefore hypothesize that directorial qualifications played a positive role in protecting outside shareholders.
INSERT TABLES 4, 5 & 6
Founders or deferred shares were shares held by directors (who were usually the founders of the company) which received no dividend until a pre-established dividend had been paid to ordinary shareholders, and sometimes they gave the holders a right to a high share of profits once the pre-established dividend had been met. 77 Only 14 of our sample companies had such shares, and all but one of these were under three years of age. 78 Given the highly incentivised nature of these shares, we hypothesise that they played some role in protecting shareholders.
The size of the board may also have been a factor in its effectiveness. As can be seen from Table 4 , the average size of boards in 1883 was 7.55. Unsurprisingly, as we can see in Table 5 , the size of boards is positively correlated with size and age, a finding that is reiterated in Table 6 . A Victorian company law expert suggested that "it is not 75 The average was £2,097. In terms of par value, the median director held £500. 76 Lindert, 'Unequal English wealth', p.1137 estimates that the average titled and mercantile man had estates in 1875 of approximately £9,800 and £11,804 respectively. Rubenstein, 'Victorian middle classes' suggests that prior to 1879, very few men had estates valued at more than £250,000 77 Thanks to a referee for bringing these shares to our attention. 78 We found 17 additional companies in the Commercial and Industrial section of BOI which had such shares, but these young companies are not in our sample as they were not reported in the IMM. can't be diverted by insiders for personal use or invested in negative net-present-value projects which benefit insiders. 84 In addition, by paying dividends, managers may have to go more frequently to the capital markets to raise funds, and are therefore subject to the discipline of the market if it is discovered that they have engaged in opportunism.
85
Dividends can thus be viewed as a substitute for legal protection. 86 In other words, if outside investors aren't adequately protected by the legal system, insiders will pay higher dividends to maintain their reputation with investors and the capital market.
We calculate two dividend measures for our sample. First, we use the dividend / par ratio which is reported in the IMM -this measures the level of dividend paid out as a percentage of a stock's paid-up value. We obtained the dividend / par ratio for 1883 and for every year in the previous decade or for as long as the company had been in existence if it was less than 10 years old. 87 Second, we use a variable which calculates the percentage of distributable profits paid out as a dividend. However, due to data availability, we were only able to calculate this measure for 424 companies in 1883.
From Table 7 , we observe that the dividend / par ratio was relatively high and that the coefficient of variation of the dividend / par ratio was low for most industries, suggesting that investors had a preference for high and stable dividends. Indeed, in this era the dividend paid was the chief concern of shareholders, and remained so well into the twentieth century. 88 The average and median dividend payout ratio for the overall 84 Jensen, 'Agency cost'; Faccio et al., 'Dividends'. 85 Easterbrook, 'Two agency cost'. 86 Cheffins, 'Dividends as a substitute'. See La Porta et al, 'Agency problems' who argue that dividends are an outcome of good investor protection rather than a substitute for it. 87 The 1884 edition of the IMM was checked in case dividends paid in 1883 were reported in 1884 instead of 1883. 88 Jefferys, Business organisation, p.409; Cheffins, 'History', p.100.
sample are high, suggesting that companies typically did not have much free cash flow.
89
Notably, the dividend payout ratio is highest for banks and railways, two of the largest and longest-established sectors on the equity market.
INSERT TABLE 7
As can be seen from Table 7 , in terms of dividend / par ratio, the financial sector has the highest ratio, which could be explained by the fact that such institutions may not have needed to retain earnings due to the nature of their business. Alternatively, as the opaque nature of assets in this sector may have increased the ability of managers to engage in opportunism, high dividend payments could be viewed as a commitment mechanism to outside shareholders.
The regression results in Table 8 indicate that larger firms had a higher dividend payout ratio, which is unsurprising as such companies are more likely to be mature entities with large cash flows and few investment opportunities. Interestingly, our growth variable suggests that a firm's investment opportunities don't appear to have affected its dividend payout decision. The coefficient on the age variable supports this finding in that company age doesn't appear to affect the dividend payout ratio.
INSERT TABLE 8
Corporate governance, dividends, and corporate value
The key question for us is whether any of the above hypothesised means of protecting outside investors were effective. One possibility would be to see whether or not these various mechanisms matter for firm market values. The usual method of measuring firm market values in corporate-governance studies is to use Tobin's Q. 90 The general idea behind using Tobin's Q in these studies is that it provides some indication as to whether managers are acting in the best interests of outside shareholders. 91 Tobin's Q relates the market value of a firm, which is the expected sum of discounted cash flows that investors expect to receive, to the replacement value of assets. These expected cash flows will be determined by the future performance of the company and the rate of managerial expropriation. We use the growth variable in our regressions to control for the potential investment opportunities component of Tobin's Q. Due to data availability, Tobin's Q is available for just over one half of our sample. possibility that high market value may cause firms to pay a higher dividend, by looking at dividend policy in the long-run. In other words, it is highly unlikely that a firm's Tobin's Q in 1883 causes a firm's dividend policy in the previous decade. However, the absence of an appropriate instrumental variable implies that our estimates should be considered as correlations rather than casual effects.
We exclude all outliers from our sample because (a) historical financial and accounting data was prone to typographical errors, (b) accounting data wasn't bounded by standardized accounting conventions, and (c) equity values might be imperfect metrics of firm value due to the absence of publicly-available information on companies. For example, in the case of Tobin's Q, we exclude all companies with a Q greater than three.
Our empirical strategy is to test whether or not dividends and governance variables are correlated with corporate value. We also include some control variables in our regressions such as company age and size, industry binary variables, market power, uncalled capital, profit, and firm growth. 92 There are two caveats which must be placed on the latter two control variables. Firstly, they are based on accounting data, which, as already stated, was not governed by standardized conventions. Secondly, they are not available for all companies, and when they are both included along with governance and other control variables, they greatly reduce the number of observations in our regressions.
Consequently, we run our regressions with and without these two control variables.
We have two different measures of dividends -the dividend / par ratio and the dividend payout ratio. Two versions of the dividend / par ratio are used, both of which are trying to capture dividend behaviour in the long-run -one which uses the average of 92 We ignore the 'reserve liability' which many banks adopted after their conversion from unlimited liability in the early 1880s because it was only callable in the event of bankruptcy, whereas uncalled capital could be called up at any time at the discretion of the directors.
the ratio from 1880 to 1882 and one which uses the average of the ratio from 1873 to 1882. As the dividend payout ratio for banks and railways is available for dates earlier than 1883, we create a variable for these two sectors which is the average of the dividend payout ratio in 1873 and 1883. We also attempt to capture whether dividend stability was something which was valued by outside investors using the coefficient of variation of a company's dividend / par ratio over the previous decade.
INSERT TABLES 9, 10, 11 and 12
As can be seen in Tables 9, 10 , 11 and 12, in terms of the governance variables, the board size variable is consistently positive across all and statistically significant across most of the specifications, suggesting that larger boards (scaled for firm size) had a positive impact on corporate value. The coefficient on the directors qualification variable is mostly significant and always positive in the specifications in Tables 9, 10, 11 and 12, suggesting that the greater the required share ownership of the board, the higher will be the corporate value. The coefficient on the ruling class directors variable is consistently negative in all the specifications, but it isn't always statistically significant.
This evidence suggests that the presence of these so-called 'ornamental' directors had a negative influence on corporate value. 93 The coefficient on the founders variable in Table 9 suggests that the presence of founders or deferred shares has a positive impact on 93 Braggion, 'Credit market constraints', finds that the presence of titled directors on the boards of newtechnology manufacturing companies had a positive impact on firm growth. His basic argument is that having titled directors on the boards of new technology companies provides such companies with a greater access to informal credit. An alternative interpretation is the titled classes were simply diversifying their wealth due to the steep fall in land prices and redistributive legislative interference in landowner / tenant contracts (Thompson, English landed society, p.307; Atiyah, Rise and fall, p.585) . Interestingly, when Braggion looks at established companies as well as the new technology companies, he finds that titled directors have a negative (although not a statistically significant) impact on firm growth.
corporate value, but once we control for firm growth, the coefficient is no longer statistically significant.
94
As hypothesized, the coefficient on the cap on votes variable is never significant, suggesting that voting arrangements which were weighted towards outside shareholders provided little protection. 95 Although not reported in Tables 9-12 , we also used a binary variable which equals 1 if the company voting scheme was one-share-one-vote, 0 otherwise. One could view this variable as a proxy for the probability of a takeover as such voting schemes facilitated takeovers. 96 However, we also found this variable to be insignificant, suggesting that the increased potential of a takeover bid did not appear to protect shareholders.
Specifications 10 and 11 in Table 9 include a market power variable, which attempts to capture the absence of product market competition on corporate value.
Although only statistically significant in the smaller sample, the coefficient is negative on both occasions, which suggests that the product market competition may have played some role in protecting outside investors from expropriation. Tables 9, 10 , 11 and 12 are positively correlated with corporate value apart from specifications 9, 11 and 13 in Table 9 . Of particular note is that the coefficients on the dividend payout ratio in Tables 9 and 10 are positive, large and statistically significant, suggesting that firms which pay out substantial 94 The founders variable is not in Tables 11 and 12 because none of the companies had three or more years of dividend payments. 95 An alternative binary variable, which was 1 if companies either had a cap on votes and/or graduated voting scales, 0 otherwise, was used in the regression specifications. This variable was also statistically insignificant. 96 Hannah, 'Divorce of ownership ', pp.409-10. proportions of their earnings have higher corporate values. 97 In addition, the sign on the dividend coef. of var. variable is consistently negative and mostly statistically significant across the various specifications, suggesting that a stable dividend payout policy has a positive impact on corporate value. Taking these findings together, it would appear that investors rewarded the payment of high and stable dividends with higher market values, implying they were an important mechanism by which investors assured themselves of a return on their investment.
All our various dividend variables in
The coefficient on the traded locally variable is positive in most specifications but is statistically significant in about half of the specifications. This evidence suggests that informal trust mechanisms may have provided some protection to shareholders. In order to see if the marginal impact of board size or the dividend variables varies with traded locally, our proxy for informal trust mechanisms, we add interaction terms to our regression specifications in Tables 9, 11 and 12. The coefficients on the dividend interaction terms suggest that the marginal impact of dividends on corporate performance does not differ much between locally-traded and nationally-traded companies. On the other hand, the coefficient on the board size / traded locally interaction term suggests that an increase in board size has a greater marginal impact on corporate performance for locally-traded companies than nationally-traded ones. This finding may arise because in companies where informal trust mechanisms were important, the more directors which were in place, the greater the number of individuals with which shareholders were acquainted.
The above raises the interesting question as to how dividends protected outside shareholders. As share prices in this financial market were largely driven by dividends (in the absence of other publicly-available data) and as directorial share qualifications meant that the median director had a significant proportion of their asset portfolio invested in their company's stock, then it was in the interest of directors to ensure that high dividends were maintained. This would have acted as a check on substantial surreptitious (or otherwise) expropriation by directors.
An alternative explanation as to why dividends protected investors is that paying dividends may have meant that managers had to go more frequently to the capital markets to raise funds, thereby subjecting themselves to the scrutiny and discipline of the market. 98 We are able to test this alternative explanation by regressing dividends (1883) (dividend par ratio in 1883) and dividend payout ratio on the change in total paid-up value of all securities (ordinary and preference shares as well as debentures) issued over the subsequent decade, which was captured by the variable new security issue. As can be seen from Table 13 , the coefficient on the dividend payout ratio variable is not statistically significant, but the coefficient on the dividends (1883) variable is statistically significant, although it is small, as is the explanatory power of this variable. Taken as a whole, this would suggest that there is little evidence to support the idea that firms were submitting themselves to market discipline by having a high dividend payout.
INSERT TABLE 13 98 Easterbrook, 'Two agency cost'.
Conclusion
The evidence presented in this paper suggests that in a laissez-faire legal environment, dividends played an important role in assuring outside shareholders of a return on their investment. Our results also suggest that large boards (relative to firm size) and requirements upon directors to own shares are positively correlated with Tobin's Q. On the other hand, the presence of independent directors from the ruling class, the so-called 'ornamental' directors, are negatively correlated with corporate value. Informal trust mechanisms also may have played a role in protecting investors in companies which issued their stock on local stock exchanges. Notably, voting mechanisms which were weighted towards outside shareholders do not appear to have been valued by them.
The main implication of our findings for the Victorian capital-market failure debate is that high and stable dividend payments and well-structured and incentivised boards may have acted as an effective market substitute for legal protection. In terms of the recent 'law and finance' debate, our findings suggest that dividend payments may well have been a partial substitute for weak investor protection laws in nascent financial markets.
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